Terrorism and Water Wars: India-Pakistan on the Brink of a Major Conflagration

Ms. Anuttama Banerji, Research Associate, National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi, India
Dr. Srini Sitaraman, Professor, Daniel K. Inouye Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, Hawaii, USA

The brutal gunning down of 26 tourists on April 22, 2025, in the picturesque Pahalgam Valley in the Indian administered Union territory of Kashmir by terrorists has provoked a tough response from India.^[1] The group—Resistance Front—an offshoot of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)—a dreaded terror outfit based in Pakistan—has claimed credit for the attacks.^[2] Immediately, the Indian government, citing the alleged support for cross-border terrorism, announced a series of punitive diplomatic measures against Pakistan.

Response from India has been swift, which has included the suspension of participation in the Indus Waters Treaty, the closure of a key and the only land border (Attari-Wagah), the downgrading of diplomatic relations, the expulsion of Pakistani nationals, and the suspension of cultural and sports events. During a strident speech, the Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, addressed the issue in both Hindi and English, underscoring a significant strategic shift in India’s response posture. He said, “Today, from the soil of Bihar, I say this to the whole world, India will identify, trace, and punish every terrorist and their backers. We will pursue them to the ends of the Earth.”^[3]

Despite Pakistan’s denial of any official involvement, Indian officials have indicated that there is strong indication of official support from Pakistan, and therefore launched diplomatic retaliatory actions. There is also active consideration of including military strikes, in line with India’s stated zero-tolerance policy toward terrorism.^[4] This heightened rhetoric has increased concerns about the potential for military escalation between the two nuclear-armed neighbors. Pakistan, in turn, has said that the suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), which has withstood the test of time and previous wars and clashes between both countries, is an “act of war.”^[5] The article will focus on India’s suspension of the Indus Water Treaty and its implications for bilateral relations and the rapidly emerging crisis in the South Asian region.^[6]

Why is the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) Significant?

The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) is a transboundary water sharing treaty signed in 1960 between India and Pakistan.^[7] It is also the oldest enduring confidence-building measure (CBM) between India and Pakistan. Brokered by the World Bank, the treaty divides the Indus River Basin between India and Pakistan, with India exercising control of the east-flowing rivers, namely Ravi, Sutlej, and Beas, and neighboring Pakistan exercising control over the western rivers, Jhelum, Chenab, and Indus.^[8] This water treaty is very valuable because it fulfils the irrigation needs of both India and Pakistan in varying measures. In India, it secures the irrigation needs of a section of farmers in the northern states of Punjab and Haryana, while in Pakistan, the treaty supports the entire agrarian economy of the country.^[9]

The treaty is also significant because it has remained a key tool of conflict resolution between India and Pakistan, especially during times of conflict between the two countries, and has withstood major wars (1965, 1971, and 1999) between the nuclear-armed neighbors. The treaty is also relevant because it has a built-in conflict resolution mechanism, which usually enables a neutral expert or international court of arbitration to settle disputes between the two parties.^[10]

Broader Implications Flowing from the Suspension of the Treaty

India’s decision to hold the treaty “in abeyance” is a direct response to the recent terrorist attacks that occurred in Pahalgam in the Indian administered Kashmir. The Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, had famously said, “blood and water cannot flow together,” after the Uri terror attacks in 2016.^[11] Another Indian minister made a similar statement in 2019 after the Pulwama terror attacks as well.^[12] Corresponding rhetoric has also flown from the Pakistani side, with Pakistan accusing India of “water terrorism” after the construction of a dam on the Ravi River in 2024.^[13] The Pakistani government has responded in a similar tone on this occasion as well, terming India’s abeyance of the water treaty as an “act of war.”^[14]

The impact of the actual suspension of the treaty is grave. It will deprive Pakistan’s 240 million people of access to water, as Pakistan is a lower riparian state. This decision will also affect India, inflicting logistical and infrastructural costs. For example, the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab rivers account for eighty percent of the Indus basin’s flow. However, “stopping the waters” of the Indus and Chenab is impractical as these rivers flow through steep, narrow gorges in the India-administered Jammu and Kashmir that severely restrict India’s ability to construct large reservoirs. As far as the Jhelum is concerned, creating a reservoir will cause large-scale inundation of the populated areas, damaging critical infrastructure.^[15]

The Indus Water Treaty has allowed India to demonstrate its long-term commitment to international conventions and norms, while also giving it the opportunity to use the provisions of the treaty to maximize its benefits.^[16] Keeping the treaty “in abeyance’ is a near-term measure to “coerce” Pakistan to stop sponsoring terrorist activities. However, the decision will likely have other political ramifications, especially for India-China water relations. The upper riparian state, in this case China, is the “hydro-hegemon of the region.”^[17] China has not been sharing hydrological data with the lower riparian state, especially India, since 2017, after the Doklam border standoff with India.^[18] In this regard, China’s proposed dam on the Yarlung Tsangpo River/Brahmaputra has also acquired significant attention as it could be potentially used as a “water bomb” against India and lower riparian countries.^[19] India has responded by conducting damming activities on the Siang River in Arunachal Pradesh.^[20] Such competitive damming activities point to the growing potential for enduring conflict over water in the future in South Asia.

Dr. Srini Sitaraman is a Professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia Pacific for Security Studies based in Honolulu, Hawaii. He benefited from various engagements and conversations during his visit to Amritsar, New Delhi, and Kolkata, India, earlier this year, in generating ideas for this article.

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of DKI APCSS, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. The appearance of external hyperlinks does not constitute endorsement by the United States Department of Defense (DoD) of the linked websites, or the information, products, or services contained therein. DoD does not exercise any editorial, security, or other control over the information you may find at these sites.

Ms. Anuttama Banerji is a Research Associate for the National Maritime Foundation (NMF) based in New Delhi, India.

The views expressed in this article do not reflect the views of the National Maritime Foundation (NMF) or any of the agencies of the Government of India.

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