



CHAPTER FOURTEEN

**CAN RIVALS COOPERATE? PROSPECTS FOR SINO-AMERICAN  
COOPERATION IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY DOMAIN**

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*Every day, I am faced with the challenges of our troubled  
and complex world. But none of them loom so large as climate  
change. If we fail to meet the challenge, all our other challenges  
will just become greater and threaten to swallow us.*

— António Guterres, UN Secretary-General,  
Austrian World Summit, May 15, 2018

**Abstract**

The complex interplay of rivalry and cooperation between the United States and China is starkly evident in environmental security. This chapter traces their evolving security cooperation from the 1970s to today, highlighting both promising instances of collaboration and persistent obstacles. Despite shared environmental concerns, deep-seated mistrust and diverging interests hinder sustained progress. Given the urgency of the climate crisis, the chapter offers concrete recommendations to overcome these challenges, emphasizing the critical importance of Sino-American cooperation in addressing this global threat.

**Introduction**

As wildfires rage across continents, seas rise to unprecedented levels, and extreme weather events become the norm, the escalating climate crisis has cast a long shadow over the geopolitical landscape, forcing even the most ardent rivals to confront the

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imperative of cooperation. The United States and China, two global powers locked in a complex contest of competition and collaboration, exemplify this dilemma. Can these rivals, with their deep-seated mistrust and often diverging national interests, genuinely unite to address an existential threat that transcends geopolitical boundaries?

This question gained renewed urgency in November 2023, when U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry and China Special Envoy for Climate Change Xie Zhenhua met at Sunnylands, California, in a significant effort to revitalize Sino-American cooperation on climate change.<sup>3</sup> The Sunnylands meeting, building on previous dialogues and agreements, produced a joint statement reaffirming their commitment to work together to address the climate crisis. It outlined specific areas for enhanced cooperation, including reducing methane emissions, accelerating the transition to clean energy, and tackling deforestation. This meeting marked a pivotal moment in the ongoing effort to bridge the gap between these two competing nations on a critical global issue.

While the Sunnylands meeting represents a positive step, it also highlights the decade-long struggle for meaningful collaboration since the historic 2014 joint announcements by Presidents Xi and Obama, a watershed moment that declared climate change “...one of the greatest threats facing humanity” and emphasized the need for constructive collaboration for the common good.<sup>4</sup> The path to cooperation has been fraught with challenges, marked by periods of progress and setbacks, as domestic politics, economic interests, and geopolitical tensions have continually shaped the trajectory of their engagement.

This chapter delves into the intricate history of Sino-American cooperation and competition on climate change, with a particular focus on the evolving security dynamics that have both propelled and hindered their collaborative efforts. By tracing the evolution of their engagement from the initial post-normalization period through

contemporary climate negotiations, we aim to shed light on the complex interplay between rivalry and cooperation in the face of an existential threat. We analyze the shifting nature of common threats, concerns about unconstrained competition, and the pursuit of relative gains, examining how these factors have shaped the trajectory of Sino-American climate relations. Ultimately, we assess the prospects for future collaboration and offer actionable recommendations for overcoming the existing barriers to a more robust partnership on climate change, a partnership crucial for the security and well-being of both nations and the world at large.

**Sino-American Security Cooperation:  
A Shifting Landscape, 1979 to Present**

The trajectory of Sino-American security cooperation over the past four decades reflects a complex interplay of shared interests, geopolitical rivalry, and changing global landscapes. The post-normalization period began with a strategic alignment against a common adversary, The Soviet Union, which fostered a quasi-alliance characterized by high-level exchanges, technology transfer, and covert operations. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union and internal political events in China led to a shift in dynamics marked by increased tension and competition.

*Quasi-Alliance:  
1979-1989*

A shared threat of a powerful Soviet Union in the 1970s, amplified by the 1969 Sino-Soviet border conflict and the looming presence of Soviet forces, forged a pragmatic quasi-alliance between the United States and China. This strategic alignment, lasting from U.S.-China normalization in 1979 until political unrest in China in 1989, manifested in three key areas.

First, high-level exchanges became a cornerstone of the relationship. Beginning with Secretary of Defense Harold Brown's

visit to Beijing in 1980, defense officials from both nations engaged in reciprocal visits, fostering dialogue and cooperation. Notably, Geng Biao, Secretary General of the Central Military Commission and Deputy Chief of Staff Liu Huaqing led the first high-level Chinese delegation to the United States in May 1980. U.S.-China security cooperation further strengthened after President Reagan's inauguration.

Second, technology transfer played a pivotal role. Initially focused on non-lethal weaponry and logistical assistance,<sup>5</sup> the transfer expanded under Secretary Weinberger to include lethal weaponry such as HAWK missile systems and MK-48 torpedoes. Significant projects like the Peace Pearl Program, which aimed to modernize Chinese fighter jets with American avionics,<sup>6</sup> exemplified the depth of this technological cooperation.

Third, covert security cooperation flourished. China facilitated the U.S. delivery of military aid to Afghan mujahedeen during the Soviet-Afghan War, underscoring the strategic alignment against a common adversary.

This decade of quasi-alliance marked a turning point in Sino-American relations, transitioning from decades of hostility to a pragmatic partnership. However, the end of the Cold War and domestic political shifts in China would soon reshape the dynamics of this relationship.

#### *Post-Soviet Era:*

##### *A Period of Shifting Dynamics and Heightened Tensions*

The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 removed the common enemy that had united the United States and China, fundamentally altering the geopolitical landscape and ushering in a period of shifting dynamics and heightened tensions. Lingering U.S. economic sanctions and China's growing unease with American military interventions, such as the Gulf War, led China to prioritize

military modernization, significantly increasing defense spending throughout the 1990s.<sup>7</sup>

Tensions flared on multiple fronts. The Yinhe incident of 1993, involving a disputed inspection of a Chinese cargo ship suspected of carrying chemical weapons precursors, deepened mutual mistrust and stoked nationalist sentiment in China.<sup>8</sup> Taiwan remained a contentious issue, with a 1995 visit by Taiwanese leader Lee Teng-hui to the United States triggering a crisis and prompting China to intensify military drills near the island. In response, the United States strengthened ties with Japan and deployed missile defense systems, further escalating tensions.

The decade was punctuated by additional military incidents that further strained relations. The accidental bombing of a Chinese embassy in Belgrade by a U. S. stealth bomber in 1999 and the EP-3 surveillance plane collision over the South China Sea in 2001 ignited diplomatic firestorms and public outrage in both countries, casting a shadow over any potential for renewed cooperation.

Despite these challenges, some cooperation persisted. China actively sought to join international security regimes with U.S. technical support, becoming a member of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) was established to enhance maritime safety and reduce the risk of unintended conflict at sea.

However, the underlying dynamics had fundamentally shifted. The absence of a shared threat and China's increasing military capabilities and assertive actions fueled the United States' concerns about relative gains and regional stability. This set the stage for a more competitive and uncertain relationship in the years to come.

*Reluctant Engagement and Strategic Competition:  
2000-Present*

The post-9/11 era brought a brief period of cooperation between China and the United States, primarily focused on counter-terrorism efforts. However, this collaboration proved short-lived as China's rapid military modernization and increasingly self-confident regional actions reignited the United States' concerns and fueled a strategic rivalry.

While China promoted a narrative of "peaceful rise," its actions, including a quadrupling of military spending from 1999 and 2009, raised alarms in Washington. The Obama administration initially pursued engagement, but this approach was ultimately deemed unsustainable due to growing perceptions of China as a strategic competitor.

Under the Trump administration, U.S. policy toward China hardened significantly, emphasizing strategic competition and highlighting ideological differences.<sup>9</sup> This shift increased tensions, a trade war, and a fundamental reorientation of bilateral relations.

The Biden administration has adopted a more nuanced approach, seeking to outcompete China while also exploring areas of potential cooperation, such as climate change.<sup>10</sup> This involves strengthening regional alliances, maintaining open communication channels, and pursuing a multifaceted strategy that balances competition with engagement.

Despite these efforts, the security relationship remains strained, characterized by deep-seated mistrust and often diverging national interests. Nevertheless, cooperation on global challenges, such as climate change, offers a potential avenue for collaboration and a glimmer of hope for a more stable and productive relationship in the future.

## **Sino-U.S. Cooperation on Climate Change: A Shared Imperative**

Despite the dominance of security concerns in recent years, a shared imperative has emerged in the Sino-American relationship: the urgent need to confront the global climate crisis. Both countries are major contributors to greenhouse gas emissions, and the consequences of climate change pose significant threats to their economies, environments, and national security.

While both countries actively participate in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change's (UNFCCC) Conferences of Parties (COP), their differing perspectives and priorities often lead to tension and disagreement.

The United States has historically emphasized "qualitative" obligations, focusing on emissions reporting, technology cooperation, and financial assistance to developing countries.<sup>11</sup> Conversely, China advocates for "common but differentiated responsibilities," arguing for leniency toward developing nations in emission reduction targets. This fundamental disagreement, highlighted by the United States' non-ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, has been a persistent source of friction in international climate negotiations.

However, the escalating climate crisis, with its far-reaching impacts on food and water security, human health, and economic stability, has intensified the need for cooperation. National climate assessments from both countries (NCCAR4 and NCA5) paint a stark picture of unprecedented and cascading climate impacts, underscoring the urgency for collaborative action despite the complexities of their relationship.

### *Analysis & Key Lessons*

While the United States and China increasingly recognize climate change as a security threat, their paths to this realization and their

levels of urgency have differed markedly. The Obama era saw a significant push for international cooperation on climate change, while the Trump administration's withdrawal from the Paris Agreement marked a stark reversal. The Biden administration's renewed commitment has opened a window for continued collaboration, but deep-seated mistrust and geopolitical tensions remain significant obstacles.

**Key takeaways from this analysis include:**

- *DOMESTIC POLITICS MATTER*: Shifts in domestic politics can profoundly impact the trajectory of climate cooperation, as demonstrated by the contrasting approaches of different U.S. administrations.
- *SECURITIZATION IS A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD*: While framing climate change as a security issue can galvanize action, it can also exacerbate tensions and complicate negotiations by introducing geopolitical considerations.
- *SUSTAINED ENGAGEMENT IS KEY*: Effective cooperation necessitates consistent high-level engagement, robust institutional mechanisms, and a willingness to find common ground despite divergent priorities.

This analysis underscores the delicate balance between cooperation and competition in Sino-American climate relations. While shared interests exist, navigating the complexities of geopolitical rivalry and differing national priorities remains a formidable challenge. The success of future collaboration hinges on sustained high-level engagement, robust institutional mechanisms, and a willingness to compromise for the greater good of the planet.

**Securitization of Climate Change in the  
United States and China**

The securitization of climate change—framing it as a national security threat—has evolved differently in the United States and



China. In Washington, the Department of Defense (DOD) initially focused on research and mitigation. Still, figures like Sherri Goodman, who coined the term “threat multiplier,” played a crucial role in raising awareness of its broader security implications. This led to the inclusion of climate change in key policy documents, such as the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the 2015 National Security Strategy.<sup>12</sup>

In contrast, China’s initial approach to climate change was primarily through the lens of economic development.<sup>13</sup> However, under Xi Jinping’s leadership and the establishment of the National Security Commission (NSC) in 2013, the focus shifted toward considering climate change as a national security concern. The 2014 Overall National Security Outlook (ONSO) explicitly identified ecological security as a critical component, with climate change as a prominent challenge.

These contrasting paths to securitization highlight the two nations’ differing priorities and perspectives. While the United States has primarily integrated climate change into its national security framework, China’s approach is more nuanced, balancing environmental concerns with economic development and political stability goals. This divergence in perspectives adds another layer of complexity to the potential for collaboration as the two nations grapple with the shared yet differently perceived threat of climate change.

*Obama-Xi Era:*

*A Watershed Moment for Climate Collaboration*

Under President Obama, the United States emerged as a global climate leader,<sup>14</sup> prioritizing climate action as a national security issue. However, despite rapid economic development, China initially prioritized economic growth over environmental concerns, resisting the securitization of climate change and highlighting its status as a developing nation.

The 2009 Copenhagen climate talks epitomized this clash of perspectives, with China's Prime Minister Wen Jiabao walking out amidst pressure for bolder emission reductions.<sup>15</sup> However, President Xi Jinping's inauguration in 2013 marked a turning point. A consensus emerged between Presidents Xi and Obama, leading to the establishment of a joint working group on climate cooperation and landmark joint presidential statements in 2014 and 2015. These statements, pledging significant emission reductions by 2030, bolstered global confidence to action and catalyzed the Paris Agreement.

The Obama-Xi era witnessed substantial progress in U.S.-China climate cooperation, establishing various institutional frameworks, including the U.S.-China Climate Change Working Group, the U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center, and the U.S.-China Climate-Smart/Low-Carbon Cities Summit. The two countries implemented policies promoting renewable energy, energy efficiency, and the phase-down of hydrofluorocarbons. Their collaboration on addressing aviation emissions also set an important precedent for international cooperation.

This period of convergence demonstrates the potential for Sino-American collaboration on climate change, even amidst a complex geopolitical landscape. The shared commitment of both leaders, coupled with robust institutional mechanisms, fostered unprecedented progress. However, this progress was fragile, as underlying tensions and differing priorities remained. The subsequent Trump era would test the resilience of this cooperation, highlighting the vulnerability of climate progress to shifting political winds.

#### *Trump Era Reversal, Biden Era Renewal*

President Trump's withdrawal from the Paris Agreement in 2017 signaled a stark reversal in U.S. climate policy. Rollbacks of domestic environmental regulations and removal of climate change

from the National Security Strategy marked a retreat from global climate leadership. This de-emphasis on climate action hindered U.S.-China cooperation, as institutional mechanisms were sidelined and collaboration on data sharing and technical assistance was curtailed.

In response to the United States' retreat, China turned to market-based solutions, promoting low-carbon technologies and seeking partnerships with individual U.S. states. However, the lack of federal engagement limited the scope and potential of these efforts.

President Biden's election in 2020 marked a significant policy shift, with a swift return to climate action. Rejoining the Paris Agreement, setting ambitious emission reduction targets, and investing heavily in clean energy signaled a renewed commitment to addressing the climate crisis. This, coupled with China's ambitious goals, created an opening for a cautious resumption of bilateral cooperation.

High-level dialogues between climate envoys John Kerry and Xie Zhenhua have led to joint statements and the establishment of working groups. Despite occasional setbacks due to geopolitical tensions, climate cooperation has persisted, culminating in the 2023 Sunnylands Statement reaffirming a commitment to climate leadership.

While the re-emphasis on climate change in the United States has facilitated this renewed cooperation, it remains fragile. Geopolitical rivalry and differing national priorities overshadow the relationship, highlighting the ongoing challenge of forging a lasting and effective partnership to address the global climate crisis.

### **Bilateral Military Cooperation in Addressing Climate Change: Navigating Challenges and Seizing Opportunities**

While the United States and China acknowledge the climate crisis as a global challenge, military-to-military (mil-to-mil) cooperation

to address this threat remains underdeveloped. This is due to a confluence of factors, including the prioritization of relative gains in the broader political sphere and differing perceptions of climate change within their respective establishments.

The U.S. Department of Defense has explicitly identified climate change as an existential threat, integrating it into national security strategies and policies. In contrast, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense (MND) and the Peoples' Liberation Army (PLA) have traditionally viewed climate change primarily as a development issue, not a central security concern. This divergence in perspectives hinders the development of a shared understanding of the security implications of climate change and limits the scope for mil-to-mil cooperation.

*Analysis:*

*Identifying Gaps and Potential Avenues*

A significant gap exists in current Sino-American cooperation: the limited engagement of military sectors on climate change. While both nations' militaries have experience in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), collaboration on climate-specific security risks remains minimal. This is partly due to differing threat perceptions within the two militaries.

However, potential avenues for enhanced mil-to-mil cooperation exist. Building upon existing HADR cooperation, joint exercises and information sharing could focus on climate-related disasters like floods, droughts, and extreme weather events. The growing recognition of "ecological security" in China presents another opportunity for engagement, with the potential for mil-to-mil dialogues on climate security implications and joint mitigation strategies.

While confidence-building measures like China's participation in the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) Exercise have faced setbacks, alternative avenues such as joint research projects on climate-related

security risks, information exchanges on climate modeling, and the development of shared early warning systems could be explored.

### *Overcoming Barriers to Cooperation*

Realizing the potential for mil-to-mil cooperation requires addressing several barriers. Fostering a common understanding of climate change as a security threat is paramount and achievable through high-level dialogues, information exchange, and joint research. Overcoming political constraints is also crucial; mil-to-mil cooperation on climate change should be decoupled from broader geopolitical tensions. Identifying mutual interests, such as mitigating climate impacts on military installations and developing climate-resilient infrastructure, can create incentives for collaboration.

Enhancing U.S.-China mil-to-mil cooperation on climate change is undeniably challenging but also imperative. By building on existing areas of cooperation, fostering a shared understanding of the threat, and overcoming political obstacles, both countries can work together to address this existential crisis.

### **Discussion and Pathways Ahead**

The preceding sections have examined the historical trajectory of U.S.-China mil-to-mil relations, the evolving perceptions of climate change as a security threat within both nations, and the existing barriers to cooperation. In this concluding section, we delve into the current discourse surrounding climate change as an existential threat and explore potential pathways for enhanced collaboration between the two nations' security sectors.

By analyzing the existing challenges and identifying potential areas for collaboration, this section aims to offer insights into how the United States and China can overcome their differences and work together to address the pressing issue of climate change. The goal is to foster a more comprehensive understanding of the

complex dynamics and propose actionable strategies for building a more cooperative and resilient framework for addressing this shared global challenge.

*Discussion: Climate Change as an Existential Threat and the Potential for Sino-American Collaboration*

The escalating recognition of climate change as an existential threat has galvanized national and international leaders to acknowledge its profound implications for global security. This shared understanding, reinforced by scientific consensus and political endorsement, presents a unique opportunity for cooperation between the United States and China, even amidst their complex and often contentious relationship.

Historically, rivals have united in the face of common threats, and the climate crisis offers a compelling case for such collaboration. However, the path to Sino-American cooperation in environmental security is contingent upon mutual recognition of the climate threat as a paramount national security concern. While progress has been made, as evidenced by joint statements and international agreements, political obstacles persist. The Trump administration's withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and China's occasional cancellation of bilateral talks underscore the prioritization of other security concerns over climate change. Nonetheless, the consistent return to negotiations signifies an acknowledgment of a significant common threat.

The defense ministries of both nations have largely mirrored their respective executive branches' stances on climate change. While formal security documents under Presidents Obama and Biden addressed the threat, they were conspicuously absent under the Trump administration. In China, adopting the Overall National Security Outlook (ONSO) signifies a gradual shift toward recognizing environmental security within the defense establishment.

Traditional security sector paradigms, focused on geopolitical rivalries and conventional warfare, have hindered the full integration of climate change as a priority threat. However, the disruptions caused by climate change are already reshaping the geopolitical landscape, creating overlaps with traditional security roles.<sup>16</sup> The security sector's involvement in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, the implications of polar ice melting on Arctic navigation, rising sea levels affecting Pacific Island nations, and internal and cross-border migration all present opportunities for deeper cooperation in environmental security.

*Pathways Ahead:*

*Fostering Sino-American Collaboration on Climate Change*

To foster cooperation and address the existential threat of climate change, several strategic considerations must be addressed:

1. *STRENGTHEN EXECUTIVE LEADERSHIP*

- *High-Level Engagement:* Continued high-level dialogues and summits between heads of state and relevant ministers should emphasize the urgency of climate change as a national security threat, fostering political will and commitment at the highest levels.
- *Policy Integration:* Both countries should explicitly integrate climate considerations into their national security strategies, defense policies, and military doctrines. This would signal a commitment to addressing climate change as a core security concern and guide future actions.
- *Public Messaging:* Leaders should consistently communicate the importance of climate action to the public and the military, fostering a broader understanding of the issue and building support for cooperative efforts.

2. *EXPAND MINISTRY-LEVEL DIALOGUES*

- *Dedicated Channels:* Create dedicated communication channels between the U.S. Department of Defense and the Chinese Ministry of National Defense to focus on environmental security issues, enabling direct and focused engagement on this critical topic.
- *Regular Meetings:* Hold meetings to discuss shared concerns, exchange information and best practices, and develop joint strategies for mitigating climate risks. These meetings should be structured and goal-oriented to ensure tangible outcomes.
- *Joint Working Groups:* Establish joint working groups to address specific areas of mutual interest, such as climate-related disaster response, environmental impact assessments of military activities, and the development of climate-resilient infrastructure. These working groups would enable focused collaboration and concrete action on specific issues.

3. *IMPLEMENT DOD/MND AND MAJOR COMMAND LEVEL DIALOGUES*

- *Operationalize Cooperation:* Translate high-level agreements into concrete actions at the operational level. This could involve joint training exercises focused on climate-related scenarios, collaborative research on the impact of climate disruptions on military operations, and information sharing on climate adaptation and mitigation strategies.
- *Build Trust:* Foster trust and understanding between military personnel through exchanges, joint exercises, and collaborative projects. Building interpersonal relationships and understanding different perspectives is



crucial for overcoming historical tensions and fostering a cooperative spirit.

4. *ENHANCE PROFESSIONAL EXCHANGES*

- *Expand Scope:* Go beyond traditional mil-to-mil exchanges to include experts from relevant civilian agencies, academia, and think tanks. This would facilitate a broader exchange of ideas and expertise on climate change and its security implications, bringing diverse perspectives and knowledge.
- *Focus on Climate Resilience:* Prioritize exchanges and training programs that build climate resilience in military infrastructure, operations, and supply chains. Sharing lessons learned from climate-related disasters, developing joint training modules on climate adaptation strategies, and conducting joint research on the impact of climate change on military readiness are all crucial aspects of this effort.

5. *EXPLORE JOINT RESEARCH*

- *Climate Modeling and Forecasting:* Collaborate on developing advanced climate models and forecasting tools to understand better the regional and global impacts of climate change on security. This would provide a more accurate assessment of risks and inform decision-making.
- *Vulnerability Assessments:* Conduct joint vulnerability assessments of critical infrastructure, military installations, and vulnerable populations to identify potential climate risks and develop appropriate mitigation measures. This would enhance preparedness and resilience to climate-related disasters.

- *Technology Development:* Explore opportunities for joint research and development of climate-friendly technologies, such as renewable energy sources for military bases, energy-efficient equipment, and sustainable supply chains. This would reduce the military's environmental footprint and contribute to broader climate mitigation efforts.

6. *INSULATE ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY FROM GEOPOLITICS*

- *Executive Agreement:* Establish a formal or informal agreement to protect climate cooperation from political tensions and ensure continuity even during strained relations. This would provide a stable foundation for long-term collaboration.
- *Independent Funding:* Consider establishing an independent funding mechanism for environmental security initiatives, ensuring that resources are not diverted due to other political priorities. This would guarantee the stability and sustainability of climate-related projects.
- *Track II Diplomacy:* Encourage Track II diplomacy efforts, such as dialogues and workshops between non-governmental experts and stakeholders, to foster a broader understanding of the issue and build support for cooperative solutions. These informal channels can complement official efforts and contribute to a more comprehensive approach.

*Challenges and Opportunities:  
A Delicate Balance*

While these pathways offer a promising roadmap for fostering Sino-American cooperation on climate change, each pathway presents unique challenges and opportunities. Overcoming these challenges

will require sustained political will, diplomatic finesse, and a willingness to compromise. The potential benefits of successful cooperation are immense, including enhanced security, economic stability, and a healthier planet for future generations.

The complex and often contradictory nature of the Sino-American relations poses a significant challenge. Deep-seated mistrust, competing national interests, and divergent security paradigms can hinder meaningful and sustained cooperation. However, the urgency of the climate crisis demands a renewed commitment to finding common ground.

By embracing the pathways outlined in this chapter, the United States and China can leverage their combined strengths to mitigate the existential threat of climate change, paving the way for a more secure and sustainable future for both nations and the world. The path forward is fraught with challenges, but the stakes are too high to ignore the potential for collaboration in the face of this shared global threat.

## **Endnotes**

- <sup>1</sup> This essay is a collaborative effort of a retired American DKI APCSS professor and two DKI APCSS fellows from China (ASC 16-1 and CCM 17-1). We have endeavored to be both candid and respectful throughout, expressing our different national perspectives as we would in a seminar setting at DKI APCSS.
- <sup>2</sup> The authors express their appreciation for the editorial contributions of Dr. James Minnich whose recommendations significantly improved the clarity and conciseness of our manuscript and enhanced its relevance for the security practitioner.
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