Chapter 8
Seizing the Orbital High Ground
Namrata Goswami
“We must treat space like a warfighting domain….
Because it very much is one.”
— General B. Chance Saltzman
Chief, U.S. Space Operations, U.S. Space Force
Introduction: Why Space Now
Warfare evolves with technology. As Clausewitz observed, the logic of war endures even as its grammar changes—and today, spacepower defines that change. What once served as a supporting function has become a contested warfighting domain, directly shaping conflicts on Earth. U.S. joint operations—long-range precision strike, missile warning, command and control, navigation, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)—are now inseparable from space-based capabilities. As the U.S. Space Force (USSF) doctrine states, “military spacepower is the ability to accomplish military objectives in, from, and to the space domain.” In the Indo-Pacific, defined by vast distances, critical maritime chokepoints, and widely dispersed bases, this dependence is not merely significant; it is decisive.
Two conflictsillustrate this transformation. In 1991, Desert Storm revealed what space enables: GPS navigation, precision-guided munitions, and global communications gave U.S. forces unmatched speed, accuracy, and lethality. Three decades later, Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine showed how space itself could be targeted: a cyberattack on Viasat disrupted Ukrainian communications, while Starlink’s rapid deployment underscored both the vulnerability and resilience of distributed networks.
The lesson is clear: control of the orbital high ground now determines operational tempo and strategic advantage. This chapter examines how the United States, China, and Russia conceptualize and contest space as a warfighting domain, the critical technologies and vulnerabilities at stake, and emerging U.S. approaches, including the Golden Dome initiative to harden deterrence through resilience and denial. Space warfare is not a distant prospect but an active front of strategic competition, and a core enabler of U.S. lethality in the Indo-Pacific.
