By Dr. James M. Minnich

HONOLULU — August 26, 2025

The ROK–U.S. alliance is entering a decisive window. With Seoul signaling momentum on wartime operational control (OPCON) transfer and Washington emphasizing “alliance modernization,” the question is no longer whether change is coming—but what form it will take. In Dialogue Episode 50, Dr. Clint Work of the National Defense University offered a historically grounded, candid assessment of what lies ahead.

Work framed OPCON transfer as both continuity and rupture. “On the one hand, it is just a transfer of operational control,” he explained, calling it “the fruition of what’s been a longer-term process and has been alliance policy for now two decades.” Yet the deeper significance is clear: “When you look at South Korea’s existence as a nation-state, established in 1948, it’s only possessed the operational control of its own military for one year…So, for them to take the lead role…that would be a fundamental shift.”

Timing and Political Will

Could the transfer occur under today’s leadership window? Work was cautiously optimistic: “If it remains the current policy of a conditions-based approach…I see no reason why they can’t do that within five years.” But he also underscored the political dimension: “There’s also the possibility, if the political impetus is strong enough to revise those conditions…the stars could potentially align.”

Combined Command and Parallel Temptations

At the center of alliance anxiety is the future of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC). Work recalled that the 2007 Strategic Transition Plan “explicitly involved the dissolution…of the CFC” and the creation of “two independent, parallel national commands,” albeit with combined elements for air, amphibious, and counter-WMD missions. That construct was later abandoned in favor of preserving CFC.

But the tradeoffs remain stark. “If you’re going to a parallel construct…by definition, that means you don’t have one strategic commander and unity of command,” Work cautioned. “This is one of the problematic elements…especially in a crisis or conflict.” Even today, he observed, “there are still elements and mindsets that might have retained a sort of parallel thrust and trajectory,” prompting the alliance to focus on “building back some of that combinedness.”

The Role of the United Nations Command

Another hinge issue is the United Nations Command (UNC). Work’s view was unambiguous: Could UNC serve as a critical multinational framework after OPCON transfer? “The short answer is, yes, it could. I would add, yes, it should.” But Seoul’s commitment is essential. “A necessary condition… is for South Korea to really embrace” multinational support through UNC, he said, and to “level up…beyond just the alliance” toward coalition management.

Deterrence, Risk, and the Nuclear Debate

OPCON transfer will inevitably test confidence in extended deterrence. “On a certain level…yes, absolutely,” Work responded when asked if it could intensify calls for an indigenous nuclear option. The logic is straightforward: “The ultimate deterrence is our own indigenous nuclear weapons program.” At the same time, he argued that much depends on how the process unfolds—whether the alliance builds trust in its future command structure and deepens cooperation on extended deterrence.

The Psychology of Readiness

Capabilities and certifications are necessary but not sufficient. “ROK officers are constantly judging themselves by the metric of U.S. command and control…That’s the highest level…an unfair expectation,” Work noted. The danger is paralysis: “If that becomes the standard, you’re never going to meet it…which means you’re never gonna transfer.” His advice was pragmatic: “At the end of the day, you just gotta do it to be able to do it…the bird has to leave the nest, it has to fly.”

Regionalization without Abandonment

Fears that modernization signals U.S. withdrawal are misplaced, Work argued. He rejected framing alliance choices as a binary between peninsula defense and contingencies like Taiwan: “They’re interconnected from the jump…it’s not either–or, it’s this and that.” While acknowledging “notable developments” in U.S.–Japan defense ties, he warned Seoul against strategic marginalization by remaining narrowly peninsula-focused.

Where Seoul Can Lead

If the alliance is evolving from a static garrison to a regional enabler, Seoul already has leverage in logistics and defense industry. “South Korea brings incredible national capacities…more than any other U.S. ally in the world,” Work emphasized, citing munitions production and maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) as key strengths that link preparedness with prosperity.

Looking ahead

The near-term agenda is clear: preserve unity of effort, adapt command and control for a ROK-led combined model, and expand sustainment and integrated deterrence across the Indo-Pacific. OPCON transfer, as Work summed up, is “both” a technical culmination and a strategic reset. The challenge is not departure, but design. The window to get it right is open—and closing.

Further Reading

Peter Banseok Kwon, Cornerstone of the Nation: The Defense Industry and the Building of Modern Korea under Park Chung Hee (Harvard University Asia Center, 2024). Samuel F. Wells Jr., Fearing the Worst: How Korea Transformed the Cold War (Columbia University Press, 2019).