By Dr. James M. Minnich

HONOLULU — June 2, 2026

Modern strategic competition is increasingly fought not only through military power, diplomacy, economics, and information, but also through law. In Episode 57 of Dialogue, Dr. Joanna Siekiera joined host Dr. James Minnich at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies to examine the growing role of lawfare—the strategic use of legal mechanisms to advance political and military objectives—and its implications for security in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.

Law as a Battlespace

For Siekiera, the first challenge is recognizing that law has become a domain of competition in its own right. While many democracies continue to view law primarily as a framework for restraint, she argues that authoritarian states increasingly use legal arguments, institutions, and procedures to advance strategic objectives. As she observed, “Russia and China, they know how to manipulate lawfare. They do that officially at every possible level.”

Lawfare itself is not new. States have long used treaties, legal claims, and international institutions to pursue national interests. What has changed is the environment in which those activities occur. Legal arguments now spread globally in real time, influence public opinion, shape diplomatic relationships, and affect access to resources, territory, and economic opportunity. In an increasingly interconnected world, law has become another arena in which strategic competition unfolds.

We Are Not the Target

One of the most revealing insights from the discussion concerned the intended audience of lawfare.

When discussing Russia’s legal justifications for its actions in Ukraine, Siekiera argued that these narratives are not primarily directed toward NATO, the United States, or Western legal scholars. “We are not the target,” she explained.

Instead, such narratives are often aimed at domestic audiences, political allies, and countries that remain economically or politically dependent on Moscow. By framing military actions through legal and historical arguments, Russia seeks to reinforce support among friendly governments, encourage neutrality among undecided states, and create alternative narratives of legitimacy.

This perspective helps explain why legal arguments that appear unconvincing to Western audiences may nevertheless achieve strategic effects elsewhere. Lawfare is often less about winning legal debates than about influencing perceptions, maintaining partnerships, and shaping political decision-making.

China and the Maritime Domain

The Indo-Pacific provides some of the clearest examples of lawfare in practice.

Siekiera pointed to China’s use of domestic legislation, administrative actions, and legal interpretations to advance its interests across the region. She cited Beijing’s actions in Hong Kong as an example of how legal mechanisms can be used to achieve strategic objectives without relying on overt military force. Changes to Hong Kong’s legal framework enabled China to tighten political control while maintaining the appearance of legal authority.

In the maritime domain, she highlighted China’s interpretation of rights and claims in the South China Sea, which remain contested by neighboring states and are inconsistent with the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling in favor of the Philippines.

At the same time, Siekiera emphasized that lawfare is not exclusively a tool of great powers. Smaller states can also use legal instruments to protect their interests. The Philippines’ successful arbitration case demonstrated how international law can empower smaller countries to defend their sovereignty and maritime rights. As she noted, lawfare can be used not only to challenge the international system, but also to uphold it.

Competing in the Gray Zone

Lawfare is particularly effective in the gray zone—the space between peace and war where states pursue strategic objectives without crossing the threshold of open armed conflict.

According to Siekiera, gray-zone competition thrives on ambiguity. Legal interpretations, contested jurisdictions, and weak enforcement mechanisms create opportunities for states to advance their interests while avoiding direct confrontation. “It all depends on interpretation,” she explained.

She connected this approach to China’s doctrine of the “Three Warfares”: public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare. Together, these tools allow states to shape perceptions, influence decision-making, and gain strategic advantages without firing a shot.

The discussion highlighted the close relationship between lawfare and information operations. Legal arguments provide a foundation of legitimacy, while information campaigns amplify those arguments to domestic and international audiences. In this sense, lawfare and information warfare often operate together, each reinforcing the effectiveness of the other.

Preparing Democracies

Looking ahead, Siekiera argued that democratic nations must become more proactive in understanding and employing the legal dimension of competition.

Education is essential. Military officers, policymakers, and government leaders need a greater appreciation for how law influences strategy, shapes legitimacy, and affects operational outcomes. Rather than viewing law solely as a constraint, democracies should recognize it as an instrument that can help protect national interests and reinforce international stability.

She also emphasized the importance of strategic communications. Democracies must be able to explain and defend the principles they support while effectively communicating the value of international norms, transparency, and individual freedoms. “Freedom is not granted forever,” she warned. “We must fight for it; we must protect it.”

Conclusion

The conversation underscored a defining reality of contemporary security affairs: strategic competition increasingly involves contests over legitimacy as much as contests over territory or military power. Whether viewed as a weapon, a tool of statecraft, or a domain of competition, lawfare has become an enduring feature of the modern security environment.

For security practitioners operating across the Indo-Pacific, understanding how legal arguments shape perceptions, influence decisions, and advance national interests is no longer a niche concern. It is becoming an essential element of strategic thinking in an increasingly contested world.

Dr. James M. Minnich is a professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. This article reflects the author’s analysis and does not represent the official policy or position of any institution.