Allied Shipyards, American Strength

By |2026-05-12T10:08:30-10:00May 11, 2026|Categories: Sitaraman, Edge|Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , |

Maritime deterrence in the Indo-Pacific depends not only on fleet size, but on the industrial system capable of sustaining, repairing, and regenerating combat power at speed. The chapter demonstrates how aligning allied shipbuilding capacity with American standards, modernizing domestic infrastructure, and integrating distributed sustainment hubs across trusted partners can transform industrial resilience into operational availability—and availability into strategic advantage.

Algorithmic Speed and The Future of Lethality

By |2026-05-12T10:05:58-10:00May 11, 2026|Categories: Watson, Edge|Tags: , , , , , , , , , , |

Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) are emerging as the U.S. military’s answer to China’s system-centric approach to warfare, which seeks to disrupt and paralyze the connective architecture of joint operations. The chapter argues that deterrence in the Indo-Pacific will depend less on platform dominance than on the ability to integrate forces, fuse information, and sustain resilient, allied-enabled command and control through CJADC2 across contested multi-domain environments.

Multi-Domain Operations in System-Centric Warfare

By |2026-05-12T10:01:11-10:00May 11, 2026|Categories: Kim, Edge|Tags: , , , , , , , , , , |

Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) are emerging as the U.S. military’s answer to China’s system-centric approach to warfare, which seeks to disrupt and paralyze the connective architecture of joint operations. The chapter argues that deterrence in the Indo-Pacific will depend less on platform dominance than on the ability to integrate forces, fuse information, and sustain resilient, allied-enabled command and control through CJADC2 across contested multi-domain environments.

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